Neiva: resilient city in front of the social–polity Colombian conflict
Wilson Giovanni Jiménez Barbosa(**) y
Giuseppe Bernardo De Corso(***)
ARK CAICYT: http://id.caicyt.gov.ar/ark:/s24690732/l3tk3584b
Abstract
This paper presents the city of Neiva, capital of the department of Huila in Colombia and aims to show the reader the various socio-political changes that the city has faced due to its geographic location, especially in the constant search to improve citizen life in terms of peace, despite its history of political conflict. The objective is to describe a contextual framework of Neiva through a reflective analysis of its history, geographic location and the relevant changes between conflict and peace processes. Colombia has suffered the effects of the internal armed conflict and in each of its cities or territories, there are particularities that mark its identity and allow understanding the present of each city from its history. Neiva is considered a tourist, enterprising, hospitable and warm city, located near Bogotá D.C., capital of Colombia, but at the same time, it is the gateway to the municipalities and departments located in the south of the country, far from the national sovereignty.
Keywords: Neiva; Intermediary city; Armed conflict; Peace.
Neiva: ciudad resiliente frente al conflicto sociopolítico colombiano
Resumen
Este documento presenta un perfil de la ciudad de Neiva, capital del departamento del Huila en Colombia y pretende mostrar al lector los diversos cambios socio-políticos que ha enfrentado la ciudad por su ubicación geográfica, especialmente en la búsqueda constante de mejorar la vida ciudadana en términos de paz, pese a su historia de conflictos políticos. El objetivo es describir un marco contextual de la ciudad de Neiva mediante el análisis reflexivo en torno a su historia, ubicación geográfica y los cambios relevantes entre el conflicto y los procesos de paz. Colombia ha sufrido los efectos del conflicto interno armado y en cada una de sus ciudades o territorios, hay particularidades que marcan su identidad y permiten comprender el presente de cada ciudad a partir de su historia. Neiva, se identifica como una ciudad turística, emprendedora, hospitalaria y cálida, que se ubica cerca de Bogotá D.C., capital de Colombia, pero al mismo tiempo, es considerada la puerta a los municipios y departamentos ubicados al sur del país, alejados de la soberanía nacional.
Palabras clave: Neiva; Ciudad intermedia; Conflicto armado; Paz.
Neiva: resilient city in front of the social–polity Colombian conflict
Introduction
This article presents the city of Neiva, located in the Department of Huila, in Colombia, Latin America. The city is the capital of Huila and is classified as a uninodal city and as a mature city for its social policy performance and more than 100,000 inhabitants (CONPES and DNP, 2014). The policy for the System of Cities in Colombia since 2014, classified Colombian cities into large ones those with more than one million inhabitants; intermediary cities between one hundred thousand and one million inhabitants and small cities those with less than one hundred thousand people (DNP and World Bank, 2014); Neiva is considered an intermediary city with a population of 370,318 inhabitants, in 2022 (DANE, 2021).
Apart from the fact that Neiva is an intermediary city due to its demographic conditions, it also plays a mediating role between its rural and urban territory, as well as with neighbouring and distant centres or areas of neighbouring municipalities or even departments; this has allowed Neiva city to fulfil intermediary functions between local, regional and national territories (Bellet and Llop, 2004). The role of an intermediary city has brought it both negative and positive aspects. One negative aspect is that its geographical location has historically made it a corridor for the extension of the armed political conflict, as well as a pathway for drug trafficking; the positive aspects lie on its natural wealth and its relative proximity to large cities such as Bogotá and Cali, which have allowed it to develop industries focused on tourism, culture, education and agro-industrial production.
The objective of this city profile is to describe the contextual framework of Neiva city through a reflexive analysis of its history, geographical location and the relevant changes between the conflict and the peace processes, focusing primarily on the changes derived from the last peace agreement, signed in 2016, in the government of President Juan Manuel Santos. In addition, the following question was used as a guiding light in the reflective section: Have the armed conflict and its peace processes changed the city of Neiva?
The reader will find that Neiva is an intermediary Colombian city whose identity goes beyond its demographic classification, as its history shows its resilience and the capacity to experience change and insist on the search for peace and general well-being, despite the sadness marked by the effects of the armed conflict.
Material and Methods
The mixed approach guided this research. Once the research objective and the guiding question was established to construct the Neiva city profile, we proceeded with the reviewing of the literature, the method of data analysis and the method of map design for specific purposes with the ArcGis programme.
On a general level, the methodological development did not follow a linear process, but rather an integrative and harmonious process as useful findings were found for the study. Figure 1 shows the method for the bibliographic review of two themes, the history of Neiva and the armed conflict in Colombia.For the data analysis method, data related to demographic information, labour market, competitiveness index by Colombian cities, victims of violence in Neiva and covid-19 in Neiva were searched and selected. Data was downloaded from institutional websites, such as the Colombian Administrative Department of National Statistics (DANE, for its acronym in Spanish), the Unit for Attention to Victims of Violence (UARIV, for its acronym in Spanish), the National Institute of Health (INS, for its acronym in Spanish) and the Ministry of Health. At one point in the research, it was necessary to confirm some data by email with the entity. Following the purposes of the study, the data were organised and processed in Excel and some were plotted for the respective analyses in harmony with the analysis resulting from the literature review.
As the bibliographic review and data analysis progressed, information was taken from DANE and the Mayor's Office of Neiva to illustrate the reader with maps of the geographical location. Then, the data was processed in the ArcGIS software to design and organise the maps that nourish the research.
Figure 1. Method of bibliographic review
Profile Of Neiva City, Huila, Colombia
Geographical location
Neiva is the capital of the department of Huila; it is located in the north of the department, between the central and eastern mountain ranges, on a plain on the eastern bank of the Magdalena River, in the valley of the same name, crossed by the Ceibas River, the Oro River and the La Toma stream that crosses it from east to west (González, 2013).
Its territorial extension is 1.533 square kilometers, making it the second-largest municipality in the department, located 442 meters above sea level, with an average temperature of 26 degree Celsius (González, 2013). It is estimated that the distribution of the territory covers an area of 4,594 hectares in the urban zone and 150,706 hectares in the rural zone. [1]
To the north, the city borders the municipalities of Tello and Aipe; to the south it borders the municipalities of Palermo and Rivera; to the west with the department of Tolima; and, to the east with the department of Caquetá.
Chart 1. Map of Neiva, current location in Colombia and Huila.
Source: Image processed from the ArcGIS software basemap, DANE data and efrainmaps.es
Its political and administrative division has been structured in ten (10) districts with 117 neighbourhoods in the urban area and eight (8) townships with 73 rural populations. Each township is associated with a rural population centre that is the epicentre of the economic, cultural, social and political activities of the surrounding population. To the north are the townships of Fortalecillas and Guacirco, to the south, El Caguán and Río Las Ceibas, to the east the township of Vegalarga, and to the west San Luis, Chapinero and Aipecito.
Chart 2. Map of Neiva, showing the townships, with respect to the urban area.
Source: Image processed from the ArcGIS software basemap, with data from DANE, the POT mayor of Neiva, Huila and Institute National of Pathways (INVIAS).
In colonial times, Neiva was an intermediate and strategic point between two major administrative centres: the former Santafé de Bogotá and Popayán, which together with the fact that the Magdalena River flows through it, made Neiva a port to market the region's livestock and agricultural production (tobacco and cocoa), as well as ceramic products, wood, textiles and the famous Suaza hats (Ferro, 2015).
Chart 3. Map of Neiva, showing distance to other cities
Source: Image processed from the ArcGIS software basemap, DANE data and web of geodatos.net
Every year, national and international tourists visit places such as the Archaeological Park of San Agustín in the municipality of San Agustín, the Tatacoa Desert in Villavieja town, the thermal springs in Rivera town, the Puracé National Natural Park in the municipality of La Plata, the Cueva de los Guácharos National Natural Park, which belongs to the Andean Belt Biosphere Reserve declared by UNESCO in 1979 and located in the departments of Huila, Cauca and Caquetá.
A Brief History of Its Initial Formation
In Latin American countries, its history is normally known from the time of the Spanish colonisation, but before the conquest, a society existed in the territory with its economic, organisational, social, religious and territorial lifestyle. Therefore, before the existence of Neiva as a city, in the same geographical space, through studies by chroniclers, colonial documents and archaeological discoveries, it is inferred that society in the region was organised by chiefdoms, which were settled because of the favourable climate with low rainfall and increased temperature from the year 50 BC (Suaza, 2012).
From archaeological research, historians have determined that the northern part of Huila was inhabited by the Pijao society, known before the conquest as "Pinao", but the Spanish conquerors changed their name to "Pijao" (Cubillos, 1946). To this day, when the Pijaos are mentioned, reference is made to their warrior capacity and their perseverance in confronting the conquerors. Likewise, ethnographic and archaeological studies suggest that the Paeces and the Duhos or Babaduhos communities also inhabited this geographical area. These communities were apparently less warlike than the Pijaos, who gradually took control of these geographical areas (Cubillos, 1946).
According to Simon (1891) the first information that the conquerors knew about Neiva was obtained by the Tunjas communities from Bogotá, who had reported that,
They added that further on from Bogotá, towards the south or south-west, there was a famous valley, crowded with people, whose lord's name was Neiva, whose land was so full of mines and he of riches, that he had as much gold as they had corn, and that above all they had a house built in a lagoon, founded on hills of gold, in the midst of a very thick pillar of the same (Simón, 1891, p. 203. Translated from Spanish).
Thus, Fray Pedro Simon illustrates that the Spanish ambition for gold and food was the stimulant for the conquest of the territory.
Then, Juan de Cabrera, following orders from Sebastián de Belalcázar, in 1539, founded the city for the first time, with the name of Las Tapias or Neiva Viejo and located five kilometres south of the current municipality of Campoalegre (Tovar, 2012), which, in 1550, was destroyed by the Tamas Indians (García, 1983). [2]
In the same year (1550), Captain Juan Alonso founded the city for the second time, but with the name of San Juan de Neiva, in what is now known as the Municipality of Villavieja (Tovar, 2012), which was again attacked and destroyed in 1569 by the Pijaos Indians (García, 1983). [3] Finally, in 1612, Captain Diego de Ospina founded the city in its current location, but with the name of "Señora de la limpia concepción del Valle de Neiva", a name that was intended to spread in the new world the belief in the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary (Tovar, 2012).
Chart 4. Map of Neiva, showing the location of the three Neiva’s foundations.
Source: Image processed from the ArcGIS software basemap, with data from DANE, web of geodatos.net, web of dices.net and google maps.
Tovar (2012) concludes that the conquest of the territory began approximately in 1538, and the city was founded three times in 73 years. It was nearly a century of struggles in the Upper Magdalena Valley between the native indigenous population and the Spanish conquerors supported by slaves of African origin.
Montealegre (2012) explains that the Spanish invasion of the territories of Alto Magdalena caused the defensive struggle of its inhabitants, especially the most combative and warlike Pijaos Indian communities. Their defeat was only possible because the Spaniards established alliances with Coyaima and Natagaima Indians. Thus, the indigenous world ceased to be a free society and the few survivors left the territory whereas Diego de Ospina, with the definitive foundation of Neiva and the indigenous and slavery exploitation, managed to increase the wealth of the city through the possession of surrounding lands (p. 170).
Demographics
For the year 2021, Neiva sheltered 367,400 inhabitants, of which 176,197 (48%) are men and 191,203 (52%) are women; similarly, in the 1,533 square kilometers, of the total population, 343,194 (93.4%) inhabitants are located in the urban area and 24. 206 (6.6%) inhabitants are located in rural areas and populated centres (DANE, 2021a), so the city has an interesting territorial logic, with 6.6% of its inhabitants located in approximately 90% of its territorial extension and 93.4% of its inhabitants coexisting in approximately 10% of its territory.
From a historical perspective, González (2013) illustrates that population growth is concentrated in the urban zone, but the rural area continues to have a significant weight in socio-economic and political dynamics due to socio-spatial segregation, political exclusion, socio-political violence and urban insecurity. Like other cities, Neiva's growth has been the result of the massive exodus of peasants attracted by the expectation of better living conditions in urban centres or expelled from their territory by rural violence (p.562).
Demographically, population numbers are increasing in the urban area and decreasing in the rural area over time, however, the growth rate in both areas tends to decrease.
Figure 2. Neiva's growth rate in urban and rural areas 1985-2020
Source: Own elaboration based on municipal population projection to 2020, according to DANE census (2005).
Graph 2 shows the growth rate from 1985 to 2020, based on the 2005 DANE census, where the population growth rate in urban and rural areas is differentiated. In the rural area, from 1985 to 1994 there was a continuous and decreasing rate, then from 1995 to 2010 there is a negative growth every year, and from 2011 to 2015 there is a continuous slight increase and from 2016; growth decreases again until 2019 and increases again in 2020. Conversely, in the urban centre, the population increase is continuous every year, but its growth rate tends to decrease.
Economic dynamics
According to González (2013), Neiva is a city with a warm dry climate, with flat areas suitable for agricultural modernisation, agro-industrial and commercial development and livestock farming; Neiva concentrates a large institutional supply of services and basic social, road and communications infrastructure, which has made it the main city in the southern region of Colombia; the main economic activities are agriculture (coffee, rice, cocoa, bananas, beans and sorghum), livestock (cattle), trade and mining (oil, marble, natural gas, gold, silver, limestone and copper).
Regarding the country Competitiveness Index of Cities (ICC, for its acronym in Spanish), according to annual reports, in 2018, Neiva ranked 10 out of 23 cities in Colombia; in 2019 ranked 11 out of 23 cities; in 2020 ranked 14 out of 32 cities; and in 2021 held position 14 out of 32 cities (Consejo Privado de Competitividad and Universidad del Rosario, 2021). According to this ICC in 2021, Bogotá D.C. in 2020 and 2021 occupied the first position with a score of 7.79, and Neiva remained in position 14 in 2020 and 2021, with a score of 5.37 and 5.47 respectively. The position of each city in relation to others shows the existing gaps among country regions, but the drop in the last two years due to the global pandemic is also notorious, as the emerging challenges in the face of covid-19 have transformed the stakes and forecasts across the planet (Consejo Privado de Competitividad and Universidad del Rosario, 2020).
However, the Consejo Privado de Competitividad and Universidad del Rosario (2021) points out that aspects such as adjustments in the structure of the ICC, the inclusion of 23 to 32 cities in 2020, the new results of the 2018 National Population and Housing Census (CNPV, for its acronym in Spanish) and the effects of the global pandemic of covid-19, influenced the changes in position. Table 1 specifies the score and position for each of the pillars[4] for 2020 and 2021:
Table 1. Pillars of the CCI for
Neiva 2020 and 2021[5]
PILLARS |
ICC Neiva 2020 |
|
|
ICC Neiva 2021 |
||
SCORE |
POSITION |
|
|
SCORE |
POSITION |
|
Overall score and ranking |
5,37 |
14 |
|
|
5,47 |
14 |
Enabling conditions |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pillar 1. Institutions |
6,07 |
12 |
|
|
5,69 |
13 |
Pillar 2. Infrastructure and equipment |
5,37 |
7 |
|
|
5,29 |
6 |
Pillar 3. ICT adoption |
5,46 |
14 |
|
|
5,53 |
13 |
Pillar 4. Environmental sustainability |
4,54 |
4 |
|
|
4,37 |
10 |
Human capital |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pillar 5. Health |
6,43 |
13 |
|
|
6,26 |
12 |
Pillar 6. Basic and secondary education |
6,77 |
17 |
|
|
6,85 |
13 |
Pillar 7. Higher Education |
3,28 |
21 |
|
|
5,16 |
14 |
Market efficiency |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pillar 8. Business environment |
5,94 |
19 |
|
|
5,97 |
17 |
Pillar 9. Labor market |
6,28 |
11 |
|
|
5,57 |
20 |
Pillar 10. Financial system |
7,17 |
4 |
|
|
7,03 |
4 |
Pillar 11. Market size |
5,09 |
18 |
|
|
5,21 |
17 |
innovative ecosystem |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pillar 12. Sophistication and diversification |
5,62 |
17 |
|
|
5,82 |
17 |
Pillar 13. Innovation |
1,82 |
18 |
|
|
2,37 |
15 |
Source: Own elaboration based on ICC 2021 data.
Table1 highlights the fourth position for pillar 10 whose position lasted the last two years with a score above 7. Its best score was in the coverage of financial establishments with 8.12 out of 10 and in the index of financial deepening of the commercial portfolio with 6.67 out of 10. In contrast, pillar 13 is of concern, although it improved its position among the 32 cities, it remains very low, the institutions involved in research and industrial property should channel their efforts both financially and productively in this pillar.
It is also noted the fall from position 4 to 10 in pillar 4, but with low variation in the score, when reviewing the pillars in all cities in 2020, Arauca occupied position 1 with a score of 5.82 and in 2021 maintained its position with a score of 7.41, distant from the Bogotá D.C. score with 5.96 that occupied position 2. However, Neiva needs to improve especially in CO2 emissions from stationary sources, companies certified with ISO14001 and investment in environmental services.
In relation to pillar 9, in addition to dropping in its score, it also goes from position 11 to 20, which is consistent with the effects of the global pandemic, but according to data from the DANE (2021c) in its September 2021 bulletin, Neiva had an employment rate of 46.7% and an unemployment rate of 17.0%, meaning an improvement from 26.4% in 2020. Thus, the DANE bulletin in 2021 shows recovery, while the ICC shows a decline, which is understandable because the 2021 ICC was constructed with data from 2019, 2020 and 2021 (Consejo Privado de Competitividad and Universidad del Rosario, 2021).
In a way, the ICC allows each city to self-assess, and the marked differences among cities in Colombia are correct, but Neiva, as an intermediary city, also orients its policies according to information on inequality and poverty. In terms of Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN), according to DANE (2021a), in 2021 Neiva has 7.57% of the total population, i.e. 27,813 out of 367,400 people have one or more UBN, a moderate percentage compared to 14.28% of the national total. Similarly, the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)[6] of Neiva indicates that 17.6%[7] of the population has a degree of deprivation in one or more dimensions and the dimensions of work and educational conditions are the highest, however, it is a moderate percentage because it is less than or equal to 25% (DANE, 2020).
According to DANE (2021b), the incidence[8] of monetary poverty and extreme monetary poverty in the last six years shows a decreasing behaviour between 2016 and 2019, but between 2019 and 2020 it shows an increasing behaviour, an increase of 14.2 percentage points in monetary poverty and an increase of 10.4 percentage points in extreme monetary poverty as seen in figure 3.
Figure 3. Incidence of monetary poverty and extreme monetary poverty in Neiva 2015-2020
Source: Own elaboration based on DANE 2021 data.
According to reports by DANE, the National Planning Department (DNP, for its acronym in Spanish) and the Administrative Department for Social Prosperity (DPS, for its acronym in Spanish), the effects of the global pandemic on unemployment and sources of income had a negative impact on the socio-economic situation of the population. Similarly, according to DANE (2021b), the behaviour of monetary poverty is also consistent with the Gini coefficient[9].
Figure 4 shows that Neiva has a trend towards equality between 2015 and 2017, similarly from 2018 to 2019 the points show that it is closer to equality, but in 2020 its trend shows an increase in inequality, even so, Neiva remains below the points of the National Gini coefficient.
Figure 4. Gini Coefficient 2012-2020 Colombia and Neiva
Source: Own elaboration based on DANE 2021 data.
At the same time, there is some coherence with the behaviour of the number of people in social classes, according to DANE (2021) as of May 2021, the variation of the number of people in social classes for Neiva is presented in figure 5, which shows that the poor population increased in 2020, but in contrast the vulnerable population decreased, possibly due to the increase in solidarity support from the Colombian government; the middle and upper classes showed a downward trend, which is understandable when analysing the labour market.
Figure 5. Social classes in Neiva 2012-2020 (figures in thousands of people)
Source: Own elaboration based on data from DANE (2020).
Poverty in times of pandemic is a socio-economic phenomenon that was studied in Australia by the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) and UNSW Sydney (2022). They concluded that between 2019 and mid-2020 the poverty situation dropped from 11.8% to 9, 9% despite the covid-19 alpha wave recession as supports and supplements halved poverty and also greatly reduced income inequality, however, in the recovery in late 2020 and early 2021, poverty increased again (from 9.9% to 14%), related to the gradual reduction in supports and supplements by covid-19. It is clear that a government's support to its citizens in difficult times is vital to address social inequalities.
Usually in Colombian cities there is a marked line of location of rich and poor, but in Neiva, the poor are scattered in the southern, south-western, eastern and northern peripheries, the rich or sectors with higher incomes are dispersed, with a tendency to concentrate towards the eastern part (Macías, 2013).
Chart 5. Map of Neiva, showing the locates social strata
Source: Image processed from the ArcGIS software basemap, with data from DANE and the POT mayor of Neiva, Huila.
However, as construction expands, Macías (2013), Neiva, on the one hand, grows in neighbourhoods and gated communities, shopping centres and urban complexes that appropriate public space, but on the other hand, the informal city also grows, with marginalised neighbourhoods and urban settlements without legalisation, mostly excluded from the benefits of the city.
Neiva, in search of peace despite the armed conflict
Have the armed conflict and its peace processes changed Neiva? This question guides the reading of the struggles that the city has faced to survive. When reflecting on significant changes, a city, like a system, has the property of heading towards entropy. Despite this, Neiva, facing the effects of both the conflict and the peace processes, has learned to adapt and overcome its weaknesses and identify its potential clusters.
Although Neiva was founded three times at the time of the Spanish conquest, it later suffered challenges as a city. At the time of independence from Spain, in 1825 the province of Neiva was integrated into the Department of Cundinamarca and was made up of the cantons of La Plata, Purificación and Timaná and Neiva, which remained the capital city (Salas Vargas, 1997).[10] Then in 1861 the Sovereign State of Tolima was recognised and Neiva was accepted as the seat of executive, legislative and judicial power due to its social, demographic, cultural and economic attractiveness (Calderón, 1996),[11] but this period of splendour declined due to the fall in the prices of exported products and political situations because in 1897 with the triumph of the Regeneration of the Sovereign State of Tolima, its capital became Ibagué (Salas, 1997),[12] so Neiva lost its status as capital city, which it regained again in 1905.
In the 19th century Neiva suffered its political configurations as the Colombian civil wars took place, in events such as the pronouncing in Neiva against the Venezuelan General Rafael Urdaneta, the War of the Supremes, the Conservative Revolution of 1851, the Revolution of the Artisans, the overthrow of Ospina, the War of 1876, the War of 1885 and the War of the Thousand Days (Ruíz, 2013). The Thousand Days War between 1899-1902 affected all of Colombia, Neiva was the scene of the Battle of Matamundo in 1900 (Tovar, 1996).[13]
History points out that Neiva, with the exception of the battle of Matamundo, was not the epicentre of the country's greatest battles, although it participated actively and consciously in each conflict, defending regional and party interests, but phenomena such as recruitment, destruction of infrastructure, fear of invasion, fear, defeat, abandonment, the taking of prisoners and death were all temporary effects suffered by its inhabitants, even during military campaigns, the city served as a barracks, shelter and larder (Ruíz, 2013).
In addition, Neiva, since the mid-twentieth century, also had a process of accelerated growth due to the bipartisan political violence that strongly affected the countryside in the face of the expectations generated by the city as the epicentre for providing services such as education, health, employment, among others (García and Macías, 2013). In fact, (Salas, 2013) contextualises the violence in Neiva, stating that one of the most marked effects was the displacement of peasant families to the urban area of Neiva and to other places such as Caquetá and Tolima; few returned to try to recover their properties and others simply did not return. The author highlights the crudeness of these periods because party political violence evolved into ideologically motivated violence.
One of the effects of the Thousand Days War was the need to consolidate a peace process in order to improve the economy and the quality of life of the people and in the process of political reorganisation of Colombia. Therefore, Colombia made important changes, including improving trade routes, relocating the displaced population, promoting sources of urban and rural work and organising new territories (Pérgolis and Ramírez-Cely, 2015). The policy of organising new territories, benefited Neiva because in 1905 the department of Huila was created, with Neiva as the capital and separated from the department of Tolima. In that year Neiva sheltered 18.333 inhabitants, 7.664 men and 10.669 women (Salas, 2012), this was a significant achievement in the history of the city.
Historically, in the 1960s the consolidation of Neiva experienced an increase in population due to two situations: first, political violence generated the immigration of people from the north of Tolima, Viejo Caldas, and the north of Valle, among others, and second, oil activity in the region since 1956 with the Neiva 540 Concession to the Intercol-Tennessee companies. This gave rise to agro-industry and forms of commerce that produced a process of urbanisation, in which the city is not only physical infrastructures but also a scenario where its social dynamics and conflicts begin to materialise with increasing impetus (Saavedra, 2013). Also, the expectations of the oil economy and the Betania hydroelectric power plant motivated the arrival of migrants who invaded land and gave rise to the birth of urban settlements in Neiva, one of the forms of urban expansion in cities.
Neiva, like several Colombian cities, has had its processes of participation and influence within the framework of the Colombian conflict, and its strategic location generated advantages and disadvantages in this regard. It is known that the armed conflict in Colombia ignited approximately in 1960 with emerging illegal groups and as a response to the economic, social and political inequalities that Colombia experienced in those decades. Historical literature tells us that it began as a result of social inequality, especially poverty and lack of opportunities for peasants and workers, and disagreements between political leaders.
However, the reader will understand that practically since the Spanish conquest, Colombia has been a territory of constant conflict, nonetheless it is called Internal Armed Conflict in the country, the process of struggle for land and the intention to extinguish the "independent republics" that began in Marquetalia between 1962 and 1964, although previously in 1948 the assassination of the populist leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitán marked the historical turning point with "El Bogotazo" (the "Bogotazo"). The death of this leader unleashed urban chaos in several cities of the country, showing that the rich and the conservatives of the ruling class stopped the possibility of the people having a political voice in politics or in society (LaRosa and Mejía, 2013). One of the effects in Neiva was the arrival of hundreds of poor peasant families called the Marquetalianos in the 1970s, who settled on the outskirts of the city, generating urban sprawl (González, 2013) and other conflicts over the struggle for decent housing. In one of the cases of invasion, to draw the attention of the government, the community called the place "the independent Republic of Marquetalia" and attracted the attention of the national media, so they were listened to and progressively provided with access to public services (García and Macías, 2013).
Since Gaitán's death, political disagreements and conflicts between conservatives, liberals and the people continued, so that, for the liberals without a place in power, it seemed that violence was the only way for political intervention (LaRosa and Mejía, 2013), Between these conflicts of peasants and workers claiming their rights and confronting the military force of the state, the government executed "Operation Marquetalia", a relevant fact that caused the continuity of violence in the country and the birth of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP, for its acronym in Spanish) in 1964 with communist ideology (Sierra, 2017). The FARC is a group outside the law that lasted until the signing of the peace agreement in 2016 and today participates in democratic life in the political party Comunes. The National Liberation Army (ELN, for its acronym in Spanish) is another outlawed group that was born in 1964 and survives today. The Quintín Lame Armed Movement (MAQL, for its acronym in Spanish), an indigenous Colombian guerrilla group since 1984, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL, for its acronym in Spanish), born in 1967, and the April 19 Movement (M-19, for its acronym in Spanish) since 1973, all of which demobilised in 1991.
Subsequently, the country suffered the effects of narco-violence and the actions of the Paramilitary Insurgent Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC, for its acronym in Spanish). The actions of the AUC are considered so appalling that people wondered who was really in charge in the country, as in the late 1990s, the FARC and ELN fought against the National Army, the AUC against the guerrillas, the National Army against all of them, and the drug traffickers against the government, also fighting or collaborating with the guerrillas (LaRosa and Mejía, 2013), it was a time of fear, chaos, death and displacement, where the number of victims, who were generally peasants, students, social leaders and the working class, increased every day.
While some governments have been identified by the direct attack and extermination of illegal groups, other governments have opted for dialogue and peace agreements. History shows that the first peace process took place in the government of President Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) with the Liberal guerrillas, then the National Front (1958-1974) was formed as part of the peace process, but other political forces were excluded and then groups of liberal peasants regrouped in Tolima and Caldas and began the armed struggle for their land rights with the intention of founding independent agrarian mini-republics, one of them, the famous Marquetalia, which was dissolved by the Colombian army and gave birth to the FARC guerrilla movement (Aya, 2017).
Every peace process has its successes and failures, and given the perseverance of the armed conflict, history highlights other processes of dialogue in search of peace after the birth of the FARC-EP, the ELN, the EPL and the M-19. President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) signed several peace agreements and is remembered for his peace and amnesty plan with different insurgent groups, but the peace plan ceased when the M-19 took over the Palace of Justice in 1985[14] (LaRosa and Mejía, 2013). With this tragic event in Colombian history, on the one hand, the process and the hope for peace was hindered, and on the other hand, the FARC took advantage of the signed agreement and formed the political party Unión Patriótica (UP), which was successful in local elections in 1986, but in the following years its leaders were systematically eliminated by mysterious actors; a backlash to reaching a peaceful solution to the armed conflict (LaRosa and Mejía, 2013).
Between 1986 and 1990, during the government of President Virgilio Barco, a peace agreement led to the demobilisation of the M-19, the EPL and the MAQL, but due to the systematic genocide of the Unión Patriótica members, the attempts to negotiate with the FARC and the ELN were infructiferous, although history highlighted the implementation of the National Rehabilitation Plan and the beginnings of the National Constituent Assembly[15] (Moreira et al., 2015).
According to LaRosa and Mejía (2013), with Virgilio Barco's peace agreement, some of the militants became national civic leaders and others were assassinated in their attempt to become presidents, even so, later in the government of President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo (1990-1994), he managed to finalise the peace agreements established with the government of Virgilio Barco with the National Constituent Assembly.
In 1990, President Cesar Gaviria ordered a military attack on the FARC-EP command centre called Casa Verde, located in the municipality of Uribe, Meta department, on the border with Huila. Then in 1992 he attempted negotiations with the ELN, the FARC-EP and dissidents of the EPL initially in Caracas, Venezuela and then in Tlaxcala, Mexico, but 10 months later, with the kidnapping and death of the Defence Minister Argelino Durán, the negotiations were suspended (Moreira et al., 2015). The government of President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) started in an environment of fighting drug trafficking, confrontations with guerrillas and the fight against paramilitaries, in addition to an economy in recession, which made it difficult to develop peace negotiations (LaRosa and Mejía, 2013).
In addition, in the 1990s, Colombia also faced the scourge of drug trafficking. The Medellín and Cali cartels dominated the cocaine market in the United States between 1980 and 1995, likewise, since the 1980s the FARC-EP ventured into the drug trafficking business by protecting illicit crops, processing points, and clandestine tracks, At the beginning of the 2000s, the ELN linked to drug trafficking by charging taxes for drug production, and later, between 1995 and 2003, with the dismantling of the Medellín and Cali cartels, the drug trafficking business was decentralized into small cartels (Ibarra Padilla and Rojas Reyes, 2022). Therefore, drug trafficking becomes an additional problem to the internal armed conflict.
Almost eight years passed without a peace process after President Barco's presidency. Then, under the government of Andrés Pastrana Arango (1998-2002), initiated negotiations with the FARC-EP for a peaceful solution to the conflict. Simultaneously, the government optimised relations with the United States which evolved into military support in terms of both equipment and human capacity (Moreno, 2006). With his "peace plan", Pastrana authorised the demilitarised zone or zone of distension, which was established from 7 November 1998 to 7 February 1999 in five municipalities: Mesetas, La Uribe, La Macarena and Vista Hermosa in the department of Meta, and, San Vicente del Caguán in the department of Caquetá (Colombian Government, 1998). The demilitarised zone covered 42,000 square kilometers, and also achieved the approval of "Plan Colombia" in the last days of the US government of Bill Clinton, but when no concrete results were achieved with peace actions, Pastrana in early 2002 ordered the national army to retake the territory, which ended in a failed peace process that affected the whole country (LaRosa and Mejía, 2013).
The Colombian government reached its limit when the FARC-EP on February 20, 2002 hijacked a plane that came from Neiva, forced it to land on a highway in Hobo-Huila, kidnapped the president of the Senate Peace Commission, Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem Turbay and they released the rest of the passengers (El Tiempo, 2002), so that, same night Pastrana communicated to the country the decision to officially end the dialogue process and ordered the recuperation of the demilitarized zone.
Chart 6. Map of Neiva, marking the demilitarized zone and its proximity to Neiva
Source: Image processed from the ArcGIS software basemap, DANE data and www.db-city.com
Despite the fact that the FARC-EP did not take the peace process seriously under the Pastrana government, the country began to strengthen itself militarily with Plan Colombia, when his government was ending. After, the government of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2010), who was president for two electoral periods, focused its efforts on the democratic security policy aimed directly at defeating the FARC-EP militarily (Moreira et al., 2015). In fact, the aim of Uribe's "Patriot Plan" was to isolate the guerrillas in the corners of the country, encircle them and reduce them with evident casualties to show the country that it was the army and not the insurgents that were winning the war, however, in 2008 the scandal of false positives emerged, which cast doubt on the effectiveness of his military victory (LaRosa and Mejía, 2013).
The democratic security policy required an increase in military spending, from 8,383 billion pesos in 2002 to 19,787 billion in 2010, in contrast, the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation registered around 50,000 forced disappearances, 117,000 homicides, 967 massacres, 56,000 threats, and 3,520 tortures in the period 2002-2010, a negative balance for the human rights and democratic foundations (Abello, 2019). In addition, the number of victims of forced displacement increased, according to Human Rights and Displacement Consultancy in 2012. Figure 6 shows that the number of people displaced increased notably in 2002, as in 2005 and 2008, and then since 2010, the number of people displaced by violence continued to decrease.
Figure 6. Historic of displaced persons in Colombia from 1997 to 2011.
Source: Own elaboration based on data from CODHES (2012)
The direct confrontation with the guerrilla groups through the Democratic Security Policy evidently caused an increase in forced displacement and also marked the history of Colombia with the false positives scandal.[16] According to research by the JEP Special Jurisdiction for Peace (2022), between 2006 and 2008, at least 6,402 civil population were presented as guerrillas killed in combat, of which 2,401 extrajudicial executions occurred in 10 of Colombia's 32 departments; in the case of Huila, there were 225 false positives.
What President Uribe did achieve, however, was a peace agreement with AUC paramilitarists, which resulted in the Justice and Peace Law. However, this did not lead to national peace, as right-wing paramilitary groups re-organised themselves into criminal gangs with political influence and economic power in their area of dominance, especially on the northern coast (LaRosa and Mejía 2013). In 2010, in a letter to the FARC-EP, President Uribe expressed the government's willingness to negotiate, but his request was rejected and they stated that they would possibly start negotiations with a new president (Moreira et al. 2015), a communication that directly or indirectly gave the next government the light to attempt peace talks.
Thus, Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018),[17] in his two political terms of governance, attempted a peaceful solution to the conflict with the FARC-EP. Santos came to power in 2010 with the proposal of Democratic Prosperity, whose bases were related to those of his predecessor and were oriented towards economic recovery with respect to the decrease in victims and attacks by illegal armed groups on the civilian population and infrastructure (Espinosa, 2018).
In such a way, in 2012 he announced his willingness to start talks in Oslo, Norway and continue in Havana-Cuba, in Oslo they signed the Negotiation Agenda and organised the negotiation teams, then between criticisms and acknowledgements, 4 years later, on 24 August 2016 between the National Government and the FARC signed in Cartagena the General Agreement for the end of the conflict and the establishment of a lasting peace (Moreira et al., 2015). The Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2014) states that the FARC-EP members present at the negotiating table had very different conditions to those manifested in other peace processes; it is not the same guerrilla attitude demonstrated in the talks with the Colombian government between 1984 and 1987, nor is it the same that appeared in the dialogues in San Vicente del Caguán, this raised expectations that the negotiations would conclude with the surrender of weapons.
This agreement was then submitted to a plebiscite for approval by the population and the results were discouraging with 60% abstention and the NO won with 50.21%, as there was a strong opposition campaign led by former President Álvaro Uribe; the agreement was then submitted to renegotiation with the NO leaders and on 24 November 2016 the new Final Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace was signed (Moreira et al., 2015). This result earned President Juan Manuel Santos the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016.
According to Bermúdez (2018), the decision to establish this peace agreement in 2011 was not an easy task. There was mistrust between the parties and among society after failed negotiations in previous eras. However, given the high level of victims of the conflict, the effects of the democratic security policy of the government of Álvaro Uribe, the transformation in the internal structures of the FARC-EP and the international context that a negotiated solution to the conflict entailed, motivated President Santos to make a decision and overcome fear and mistrust of previous failures to reach a peace agreement.
In fact, this government was identified for attempting peaceful strategies not only in the face of the armed conflict but also to improve relations with Ecuador, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile and Peru, as well as initiating trade dialogues with China and other European countries, and even surprisingly signing and implementing the Law on Victims of the Armed Conflict since 1985, a first step in the attempt to repair part of the damage caused by a long and historic conflict that seemed difficult to end (LaRosa and Mejía, 2013). This was an important phase, but it was followed by the challenge of implementing it over time as a state policy, which became a bleak one in the government of President Iván Duque, who was backed by the political party that has strongly questioned the peace process.
President Duque in his 2018-2022 government period did not consolidate the peace signed with the FARC-EP, but he could not discard it either. In this way, it is observed that his "Peace with legality" security policy, he weakened organized armed groups and privileged territorial control in the territories most affected by the armed conflict, and advanced in the demobilization of approximately 13,000 FARC-EP combatants (Mantilla B. J., Cajiao V., A., and Tobo C., P., 2022).
However, Indepaz (2021) in its records shows that homicides due to the armed conflict decreased (81,190 cases in 2002, 12,665 in 2012, 1,238 in 2016, and less than 697 in 2019); in addition, the indicators of forced disappearance, summary executions, and false positives, kidnappings, and torture. But without comprehensive and determined support for the peace agreement, there are also depressing figures, between 2016 and 2021 there were 1,270 homicides of social leaders and human rights defenders, of which 872 occurred in the Duque government and of them, 24 homicides in Huila (Indepaz, 2021).
In addition, the Duque government made partial progress such as the investment of 14 billion pesos in Development Programs with a Territorial Focus on the prioritized municipalities; important advances in the Comprehensive Peace System despite the objections of President Duque himself; and, the reincorporation of ex-FARC combatants by 49%, an important achievement, but overshadowed by the murder of more than 300 signatories with their families (Rodríguez A., 2022).
The Colombian Truth Commission (2022) presented its final report in the last months of the Duque government, the content of which shocked the country given the findings that show the results of the armed conflict and the permissiveness of these inhumane acts is strongly questioned, for this emphasizes the strong commitment that the next president must give and invites to continue with the national dialogue to face the causes of the conflict and, above all, never repeat the brutality of the war, Colombia needs to work on a reconciliation process to coexist in society and respecting differences without the need for violence.
As a result, the current government of President Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego has faced high challenges in the face of the peace process in its period 2022-2026.
The impact of the armed conflict in the city of Neiva (Huila, Colombia)
This context of the country had obviously impacted the city of Neiva because of its geographical location, its proximity to the Colombian capital, Bogotá D.C., which could enjoy greater prosperity and peace, but at the same time, because of its proximity to the southern periphery of Colombia, which made Neiva face social and economic challenges.
As a city, the internal conflict in some ways defines its identity; the distrust of institutions and the increasing arrival of families displaced by violence, obliges it to take action to address poverty and unemployment. Similarly, with regard to peace policies, the latest "Final Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace" of 2016, brought a breath of hope, especially in its rural and peripheral areas, however, despite the fact that the Agreement states that the conflict would end in 2016, Neiva has not yet been able to reach peace, even when the Agreement states that "the National Government will be responsible for the correct implementation of the agreements reached in the peace talks process" (Colombian Government and FARC, 2016), the government of President Duque is experiencing a period of uncertainty in terms of the effective fulfilment of the peace agreement or the timid disregard for it.
Neiva is one of the country's intermediary cities which, due to its strategic geographic location, has experienced negative side effects, but in some way, the city was forced to establish synergies to overcome its weaknesses and strengthen itself. Being close to the zone of action of illegal groups has meant an increase in the number of victims of the conflict, but at the same time its urban expansion has increased and with it the problems of settlements and invasions that every day generate new challenges of territorial planning and poverty, but also of demographic growth and the implementation of strategies to move forward.
In Colombia, as of 31 January 2022, there are 8,219,403 people registered in the information system due to forced displacement, of which 76,203 people listed in Neiva, but among them 55,118 identified as displaced population, and of these, 51,914 have received some type of attention. The report shows that 72.3% of the people who have arrived as displaced victims have stayed in the city, which is understandable because at the same time, 94.1% of the people who have stayed in the city have received assistance. This demonstrates not only one of the forms of demographic growth in the city, but also of cultural exchange.
Although Neiva is considered a society involved in years of social, political and armed conflicts together with an overflowing growth, accompanied by urban socio-spatial segregation (González, 2013), there is also a community concerned about facing these situations, that is why its political leaders, academics, entrepreneurs, among others, do not give up and have taken advantage of the policies and tools offered by the National Government. Since 2004, the DNP was in charge of motivating the construction of the Internal Agendas of competitiveness and productivity in the country, the entity designed the methodology, but the Internal Agenda of each department was defined by the territorial agents, Therefore, in the city of Neiva, the strategic agents recognise that Huila is a region affected by the violence of the armed conflict, with a relative backwardness, but it is also a region rich in natural, cultural and human resources that allow it to identify its productive potential (Department of Huila and Chamber of Commerce of Neiva, 2007). Thus, they defined five productive challenges: agro-industrial, tourism, fish farming, mining and energy challenges. Therefore, since 2007, in local governments, both in the Department and in the municipalities, the Internal Agenda has been part of the projects in the development plans.
In 2015, the different agents again updated the Internal Agenda, in which after considering the new scenario of the region, they defined the same five productive commitments and added the commitment to the creative economy, understood as the activities that harmoniously lead the transformation of ideas into cultural goods and services whose value is determined by intellectual property (Gobernación del Huila and Neiva Chamber of Commerce, 2015).
As a city, in 2018, taking advantage of policies of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Neiva was part of the Emerging and Sustainable Cities Program (CES), which supported the formulation of action plans for 77 cities in Latin America and the Caribbean, Neiva city was prioritized for its capacity to improve environmental, urban, fiscal and governance issues (IDB et al., 2018).
In this action plan, these three axes with their respective programs were structured for Neiva, at a cost of 1.124 billion Colombian pesos. The axis of "Government for regional leadership" with programs of finance, planning and institutional modernization; the axis of "Territory for conservation and development" with programs of tourism, agro-industry, education, health and environment; and, the axis of "City for reintegration and reconciliation" with programs of regional consolidation in the Magdalena, in the center-east, with the south, airport centrality and general urbanization.
Agents and sectors recognize that Neiva's geographic location has allowed for progress and setbacks; this location makes it a place of passage with the strategic potential of access to corridors where the conflict is acute in the eastern and central mountain ranges, facilitating mobility towards Tolima, Cauca, Meta and Caquetá (González, 2013), for this reason, Neiva's vocation is determined by environmental, cultural and economic conditions at regional level, which allow it to be identified as a leading center for the development of the region, which can articulate relations between a south-eastern region, bordering Brazil, Peru and Ecuador, thus as part of a central region, the city faces challenges to move towards sustainability and competitiveness (IADB et al., 2018).
Recognizing the political violence that the city has suffered and continues to suffer, due to its demographic, urban and economic transformations, the negative impact caused by each event of the armed conflict is tangible, but there is also evidence of changes caused by each process of peaceful negotiation, which is positive, although negotiation processes are never completely fulfilled.
Undoubtedly, Neiva is a Colombian city that has learned to live in the vicious circle of armed conflict when there are repressive actions. In the post-conflict period, with a relative calm, the city takes advantage to enhance its identity as a hospitable city; it is a vicious circle that has been going on for more than five decades, but Neiva citizens continue to persevere in preserving their identity, attracting tourists because of its geographical advantages, its culture and folklore, and its productive potential. At the same time, Neiva developed the capacity to coexist with the population from both the countryside and the south of the country, who come to the city in search of a better quality of life.
While the Colombian government, illegal armed groups and academics debate whether the guerrillas currently exist out of altruism, justice and equity, or out of greed, power and economic criminality as explained by Camacho (2002), local institutions, regional leaders and different sectors remain attentive to improving the city despite the discouraging scenarios. Taking advantage of the competitive benefits, the Sustainable Neiva 2040 action plan, the city resource management capacities due to its location and the fact that it is the capital of the department of Huila, the organization of Neiva as a metropolitan area with neighboring municipalities such as Rivera, Campoalegre, Palermo, Villavieja, Aipe, Baraya and Tello has been promoted; since 2020 the productive sectors, academia and political leaders have invested time to dialogue on the subject under the umbrella of expert advice (Concejo Municipio Neiva, 2020).
Neiva, considered a city that has learned to deal with the vicious circle between conflict and peace, now also faces the challenges of the global pandemic of Covid-19. As of 25 March 2022, of the 6,082,577 positive cases of Covid-19 in Colombia, there were 62,244 positive cases in Neiva, of which 1,814 died, meaning that the case fatality rate for positive cases in the city is 2.91%, higher than the national fatality rate of 2.29% (National Institute of Health, 2022), and the mortality rate for Covid-19 is 255.6 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants per year in Neiva, with an annual mortality rate of 255.6 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in Neiva in 2021, higher than the national total, which is 177.6 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in the same year (DANE, 2022), so the percentage of lethality and the mortality rate in Neiva are higher than the national average, a challenging situation for the health and economy of the city.
Additionally, the labour market was affected by the pandemic, but the data show a hopeful future. Figure 6 shows the employment rate in Neiva as of 2016[18] according to (DANE, 2022). Stability is observed, with variations in 2020 and indicates a path towards recovery in 2021.
In contrast, the unemployment rate also underwent variations with the covid-19, with data from (DANE, 2022), figure 7 shows the unemployment rate in Neiva, peak unemployment was between November 2020 and January 2021, and shows a path to recovery between November 2021 and January 2022.
Figure 7. Employment rate in Neiva 2016-2021
Source: Own elaboration with data from DANE (2022).
Figure 8. Unemployment rate in Neiva 2016-2021
Source: Own elaboration with data from DANE (2022).
Nevertheless, it is encouraging to know that Neiva's Municipal Epidemiological Resilience Index (IREM) is 0.81 (Colombian Ministry of Health, 2022), which means that the city has had a good trend in the face of economic, cultural and social openness in the context of overcoming the covid-19 pandemic. Neiva is now not only full of people who are resilient to the impacts of the armed conflict but also to the global pandemic.
It is significant to highlight that every day its image grows as the city of eternal summer with hospitable people and tourist destination between the months of June and July to enjoy the "Festival Folklorico y Reinado Nacional del Bambuco" (Bambuco Pageant and Folkloric Festival). When enjoying the festivities in the middle of the year, tourists can travel to the "Aguas termales de Rivera", to the "Desierto de la Tatacoa and the astronomical observatory", to the "Parque Arqueológico de San Agustín'' and to the "Parque Cueva de los Guácharos", places located in the same department of Huila. In table 2, the tourist and cultural information of Huila shows the flow of people and vehicles that move in and out of Huila, the reduction at the time of Covid-19 is evident, and then the recovery from 2021.
Table 2. Tourist and cultural information about Huila
Year or Month |
Visits to tourist attractions |
% Hotel occupancy |
Vehicles traveled on route 45 |
Passengers mobilized by land transport |
Passengers mobilized by air transport |
2018 |
547.603 |
40,31% |
4.416.317 |
9.786.335 |
295.200 |
2019 |
1.436.612 |
48,40% |
5.538.463 |
7.635.342 |
362.160 |
2020 |
93.693 |
25% |
4.257.522 |
2.640.244 |
96.053 |
2021 |
327.340 |
39% |
5.161.792 |
3.577.303 |
190.543 |
January 2022 |
45.383 |
61% |
717.359 |
672.358 |
25.073 |
Easter 2022 |
31.035 |
54% |
187,492 |
124.469 |
5.200 |
June 2022 |
32.680 |
40% |
629.351 |
didn't report |
206.072 |
October 2022 |
19.239 |
39% |
719.491 |
705.092 |
371.112 |
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Statistical Bulletins of the Tourist and Cultural Information System of
Huila 2019 to 2022.
The data is from all of Huila, but it is clear that Neiva is the gateway to enjoy hiking, trekking, tropical forests and natural waters to the departments of Caquetá, Putumayo, Amazonas and Cauca. With the peace processes, the tension in its inhabitants is reduced; in order to continue with their lives, the economy becomes dynamic and at the same time, local tourism leaving and visiting the region[19] increases in its different classifications: natural, holiday, business, cultural or scientific tourism. It should be noted that small and medium-sized cities are gaining ground as centres of economic growth (Berdegué et al., 2015).
Conclusions
In conclusion, with the capacity of Neiva citizens to face and overcome various political conflicts, especially the internal armed conflict and the last two peace processes, the "peace plan" in 1998 and the "Final Agreement for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace" in 2016, it can be concluded that these dynamics have changed Neiva by contributing to its demographic growth in the city and demographic decrease in rural areas mainly. With this, in each process, its political, social and economic actors have been actively involved to take advantage of its agricultural, tourism, mining, fish farming, energy and creative economy potential through strategic alliances with national and international bodies.
The exercise of describing the contextual framework of Neiva through a reflective analysis based on the historiography of the city, data, institutional and academic studies, allowed the consolidation of this research to show that the city constitutes a resilient, persevering and expectant society in the face of each conflict and its respective peace process, extracting the useful connotations for this study and not falling into the temptation to expand on other equally significant themes, constituted a challenge for the authors, since Neiva as an intermediary city and as a population unit, as in Colombia, lives facing those scenarios. The bleak situations of corruption, internal armed conflict, drug trafficking and inequality, apart from being scourges, have also served as a starting point for implementing strategies, policies and peace processes that have impacted its citizens in demographic, ethnic, social, economic and political dimensions.
Knowing that both the armed conflict and its peace processes have changed Neiva, the study also provided the following insights:
Over time in Neiva, the population is agglomerated in the urban area and decreasing in the rural area. Therefore, those who lead the development of the city have the task of thinking strategically about the dynamics of the rural area, as one of the cultivated products is coffee, whose agro-industrial process allows for the export of quality coffee, which is promoted as a product of the regional economy that contributes most to the gross domestic product of Huila and is competitive in global flows of exchange of goods (Cerquera et al., 2020).
The fact that President Duque's government does not strongly support the 2016 Final Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace has generated hesitation, especially in rural areas. Aspects such as the wide extension of the rural area, the difficulties of its inhabitants and the uncertainty about the peace process, generate a city with a greater concentration of people in urban areas and in the long term there would be an uncertain future, with these possible scenarios: increase of landowners and with it an increase in inequalities, high cost to access cultivated food, increase of imports of processed food and with it, the change in people's health, and, increase of inequality and poverty in the urban area.
Neiva, like the other intermediary cities in Colombia, is currently experiencing not only a post-conflict but also a post-Covid-19 phase, the data show that both its fatality rate and mortality rate are higher than the national average, but in contrast the labour market data show a recovery by the end of 2021 and the beginning of 2022. It can be inferred from history and data that the city again shows its capacity to overcome socially problematic situations.
Historically, both conflict and peace processes have generated changes that require Neiva's capacity to adapt. As one of the cities that receives and retains more than 70% of the displaced population, this implies that ethnic, cultural, demographic, social and economic changes are taking place, with both negative and positive impacts for the city well-fare
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Recibido: 01/06/2022
Evaluado: 02/01/2023
Versión Final: 20/01/2023
(*) Doctoranda en Modelado en Política y Gestión Pública (Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano). Profesora de tiempo completo (Universidad Surcolombiana - Neiva), Colombia. Email: patricia.gutierrez@usco.edu.co. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2928-5906
(**) Doctor en Ciencias Sociales, Niñez y Juventud (Universidad de Manizales – CINDE). Profesor de tiempo completo (Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano), Colombia. Email: wilsong.jimenezb@utadeo.edu.co. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0467-0365
(***) Doctor en Ciencias Políticas (Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano). Profesor de tiempo completo (Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano), Colombia. Email: giuseppeb.decorsos@utadeo.edu.com. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4677-5130
[1] Information available in the Municipal Development Plan of Neiva 2016-2019
[2] Cited in Suaza, 2012, p. 38.
[3] Cited in Suaza, 2012, p. 38.
[4] The structure of the 4 factors and 13 pillars is proposed by the World Economic Forum, the score is out of 10 and the position is amongst 32 cities.
[5] The data for both years are taken from the ICC 2021 as they were recalculated given the adjusted aspects.
[6] In Colombia, the MPI consists of five dimensions, all of which are measured at the household level: a) educational conditions, b) conditions of children and youth, c) health, d) work and e) housing conditions and public utilities. These dimensions are divided into 15 variables and a household with deprivations in at least 5 variables is considered to be in a condition of multidimensional poverty (DANE, 2019).
[7] Projected by DANE from the CNPV 2018, as of February 2021.
[8] Data from DANE's Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (2012 - 2020), projected and updated to April 2021.
[9] The Gini Coefficient is an indicator devised by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini that is used to measure the level of inequality among the inhabitants of a region. It is a number between 0 and 1, where 0 is perfect equality (all individuals or families have the same income) and 1 represents inequality (only a few households or individuals concentrate all the income).
[10] Cited in Salas, 2012, p. 54.
[11] Quoted in Salas, 2012, p. 55.
[12] Cited in Salas, 2012, p. 58-59.
[13] Cited in Salas, 2012, p. 60.
[14] The Colombian Palace of Justice is a building located in the Plaza de Bolívar in the city of Bogotá. This building is the symbol of the Colombian Judiciary and gathers all the offices of the Judicial Branch: The Supreme Court of Justice, the Council of State, the Constitutional Court, and the Superior Council of the Judiciary. The Judicial Branch is in charge of enforcing the laws in Colombia (Bogotá Vive, 2023).
[15] The National Constituent Assembly meant the representation of participatory and pluralistic democracy in Colombia, it was responsible for the Political Constitution of Colombia of 1991, which replaced the Constitution of 1886. Its organization occurred in the governments of Virgilio Barco and Cesar Gaviria. It began its work on February 5, 1991, and ended on July 4, 1991, with the promulgation of the new Constitution Political. This space represented a historical change to face the social and political conflicts in Colombia.
[16] These are extrajudicial executions by the military forces, in which they murdered civilians and presented them as guerrillas killed in military combat, to obtain economic rewards established in Decree 029 of 2005 of the Colombian Ministry of Defense.
[17] This government lasted two political terms, from 2010-2014 and re-elected for 2014-2018.
[18] It is shown from 2016, when the final peace agreement was signed.
[19] For more information, see glossary of tourism in web page https://www.unwto.org